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Abstract 
 
Privacy preservation is an important issue in 
today’s context of extreme penetration of internet and 
mobile technologies. It is more important in the case of 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) where collected 
data often requires in-network processing and 
collaborative computing. Researches in this area are 
mostly concentrated in applying data mining 
techniques to preserve the privacy content of the data. 
These techniques are mostly computationally expensive 
and not suitable for resource limited WSN nodes. In 
this paper, a scheme is developed to provide privacy 
preservation in a much simpler way with the help of a 
secure key management scheme and randomized data 
perturbation technique. We consider a scenario in 
which two or more parties owning confidential data 
need to share only for aggregation purpose to a third 
party, without revealing the content of the data. 
Through simulation results the efficacy of our scheme 
and compare the result with one of the established 
scheme [1]. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The explosive growth of hardware, software along 
with immense computing and communication power of 
the system and devices, it is unbelievably easy to store, 
retrieve and process large amounts of information. 
Good amount of privacy issues also arise with the 
proliferation of digital technologies. Explosive 
progress in networking, storage, and processor 
technologies has led to the creation of ultra large 
databases that record unprecedented amount of 
transactional information. In tandem with this dramatic 
increase in digital data, concerns about informational 
privacy have emerged globally. Privacy issues are 
further exacerbated now that the World Wide Web 
(WWW) makes it easy for the new data to be 
automatically collected and added to databases [2]. 
With ubiquitous connectivity, people are increasingly 
using electronic technologies in business-to-consumer 
and business-to-business settings. This in effect helps a 
third party to acquire the confidential and private 
information from various avenues. Depending upon the 
nature of the information, users may not be willing to 
divulge the individual values of records. This has lead 
to concerns that the private data may be misused for a 
variety of purposes. Privacy can be defined as the 
limited access to a person or a process and to all the 
features related to the person or the process. Privacy 
preservation is important from both individual as well 
as organizational perspectives. For example, customers 
might send to a remote database queries that contain 
private information. Two competing commercial 
organizations might jointly invest in a project that must 
satisfy both organizations' private and valuable 
constraints, and so on. In order to alleviate these 
concerns, a number of techniques have recently been 
proposed to perform the data mining tasks in a privacy-
preserving way, which is called Privacy Preserving 
Data Mining (PPDM). The research of PPDM is aimed 
at bridging the gap between collaborative data mining 
and data privacy. Privacy-preserving data mining finds 
numerous applications in surveillance, in-network 
processing which are naturally supposed to be 
“privacy-violating” applications. The key is to design 
methods [4] which continue to be effective, without 
compromising security. 
In this paper, we consider a scenario where data 
aggregation needs to be done in privacy-preserved way 
for distributed computing platform. There are number 
of data sources which collect or produce data. The data 
collected or produced by the sources is private and the 
owner or the source does not like to reveal the content 
of the data. But the collected data from the source is to 
be aggregated by an aggregator, which may be a third 
party or part of the network, where the data sources 
belong. The data sources do not trust the aggregator 
and like to hide the content of the data. So the data 
needs to be secure and privacy protected. In tune of 
that, we propose a scheme which is secure and privacy 
preserved. The computation for the aggregation is 
based on the concept of Secure Multiparty 
Computation (SMC). Generally, this problem can be 
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seen as a computation of a function f (x1, x2, ..., xN) on 
private inputs x1, x2, ...,xN in a distributed network with 
n participants where each participant i knows only its 
input xi and no more information except output f (x1, 
x2, ..., xN) is revealed to any participant in the 
computation. In our case the function is SUM. We 
apply the property of modular arithmetic to recover the 
aggregated value. In our scheme, privacy is preserved 
through randomization process. The security part is 
handled by random key pre-distribution method. The 
scheme is simple in nature with low computational 
complexity, which makes it suitable for practical 
implementation particularly in the case where the 
source nodes do not have much computational 
capabilities. We compare the results, importantly the 
computational complexity performance of our scheme 
with that of described in [1], which has the same 
objective of secure privacy-preserving data 
aggregation. The proposed scheme has two parts: 
1. Secure key management 
2. Privacy preservation 
The paper is organized as follows. In next section, 
related works in the field of privacy preservation is 
highlighted. In section 3, the considered system model 
is shown. After that, in section 4, we present the key 
distribution scheme. We present privacy preservation 
scheme in section 5. In section 6, we describe and 
analyze the simulation results. Finally, we conclude the 
paper in section 7. 
 
 
2. Related Work 
 
In the literature, number of techniques has been 
illustrated to effectively preserve the privacy of the 
source data. One of most popular method is 
randomization. The randomization method is a 
technique in which noise is added to the data to be 
privacy-protected. This is done to mask the attribute 
values of records [5]. The noise added to the data is 
sufficiently large so that individual values cannot be 
recovered. Therefore, techniques are designed to derive 
aggregated distributions from the perturbed data 
values. Subsequently, data mining techniques can be 
developed in order to work with these aggregate 
distributions. The randomization method has been 
traditionally used in the context of distorting data by 
probability distribution for methods such as surveys. 
There are two major classes of privacy preservation 
schemes are applied. One is based on data perturbation 
techniques, where certain distribution is added to the 
private data. Given the distribution of the random 
perturbation, the aggregated result is recovered. In 
another technique, randomized data is used to data to 
mask the private values. However, data perturbation 
techniques have the drawback that they do not yield 
accurate aggregation results. It is noted by Kargupta et 
al. [6] that random matrices have predictable structures 
in the spectral domain. This predictability develops a 
random matrix-based spectral-filtering technique 
which retrieves original data from the dataset distorted 
by adding random values. There are two types data 
perturbation. In additive perturbation, randomized 
noise is added to the data values. The overall data 
distributions can be recovered from the randomized 
values. Another is multiplicative perturbation, where 
the random projection or random rotation techniques 
are used in order to perturb the values. In tune of their 
argument, we apply the second technique of masking 
the private data by some random numbers to form 
additive perturbation. 
Our objective of privacy preserved secured data 
aggregation falls under the broad concept of Secure 
Multiparty Computation (SMC) [7-11]. SMC and 
privacy preservation are closely related, particularly 
when some processing or computation is required on 
the data records. Historically, the SMC problem was 
introduced by Yao [3] where a solution to the so-called 
Yao’s Millionaire problem was proposed. In general 
SMC problem deals with computing any (probabilistic) 
function on any input, in a distributed network where 
each participant holds one of the inputs, ensuring 
independence of the inputs, correctness of the 
computation, and that no more information is revealed 
to a participant in the computation than can be inferred 
from that participant's input and output [7]. The 
aggregation methods of privacy-preservation are dealt 
well in [8]. In [1], Wenbo He et.al. propose schemes to 
achieve data aggregation while preserving privacy. The 
scheme they proposed, CPDA (Cluster-based Private 
Data Aggregation) performs privacy-preserving data 
aggregation in low communication overhead with high 
computational overhead.  
In this work, we propose the privacy-preserving 
data aggregation scheme which has much lower 
complexity than the CPDA scheme in [1]. We have 
shown in our scheme that simple use of modular 
arithmetic and additive randomization of the data 
records can be sufficient for privacy preservation.  
 
3. System Model 
 
In this section we present the system model, based 
on which the scheme is developed. This is shown in 
fig. 1. It is shown that there are N numbers of source 
nodes or sources which collect or produce the private 
data. These sources are the owners of the private data. 
Against the query of the service provider or the server, 
IEEE ICWCMC 2010, Valencia, Spain Page 3 
 
the sources answer the query of the server. In this 
process, the sources never reveal the content of the 
private data, i.e. they never share the private data in 
raw form. They perform some data perturbation 
technique on the raw data, from which the server 
cannot understand the original content of the data. The 
function of the server is to aggregate the data received 
from n servers. It may send the aggregated data value 
for further processing. It is also assumed that for each 
source at least one source is connected. The aggrgator 
or server node has the responsibility of data 
aggregation and further processing of the aggregated 
data. This server node has connection with N number 
of source nodes, which are connected with the server 
node through wireless links. These source nodes 
collect the data on its own or as per the instruction by 
the server node. It is assumed that the also source 
nodes have peer-to-peer connectivity atleast with one 
of the nodes inorder to reach the aggregator. We define 
data aggregator function as: 
  , 
, … ,  
Without loss of generality, we consider sum function, 
though typical aggregation functions like mean, min, 
max can also be included.  
  


 
 
In order to model the individual behaviors of the 
participating parties, we adopt the semi-honest model 
[7] that is commonly used in SMC. A semi-honest 
party follows the rules of the protocol, but it can later 
use what it sees during execution of the protocol to 
compromise other parties’ data privacy. Such kind of 
behavior is referred to as honest-but-curious behavior 
[7] or passive logging [9].The semi-honest model is 
realistic for our context as each participating party will 
want to follow the agreed protocol to get the correct 
result for their mutual benefits and at the same time 
reduce the probability and the amount of information 
disclosure about their private data during the protocol 
execution due to competition or other purposes.  
In order to counter both the problem of security and 
privacy, our scheme consists of a secure key 
distribution scheme along with the privacy 
preservation mechanism. In fact, our scheme has two 
separate parts. First one is the key distribution, which 
guarantees the secure communication. This key 
distribution is part of the security system. Other part is 
privacy preservation through modular arithmetic. This 
key distribution method is described next followed by 
our privacy preservation scheme. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Privacy preserved data aggregation 
system model 
 
4. Secure Key Distribution 
 
For secure key distribution, we follow the method 
proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor, which is called 
random key pre-distribution [10]. In our scheme we 
have K number of keys, which is stored in every source 
node. Of that K-k keys are shared with the 
server/aggregator for source to aggregator secure 
communication and k number of keys are kept for 
source to source communication. Our secure key 
distribution method has two parts. 
1. Aggregator to source key exchange 
2. Source to source key exchange 
 
4.a Aggregator to source key establishment: 
 
It is described that each source node has K-k 
number of keys shared with the server. As, all the 
source nodes possess the same keys, it is totally 
unsecure when a source node communicates with the 
server node with the shared key. Any malicious source 
node can decipher the source nodes’ communication 
with the server and can launch attack very easily. In 
order to avoid this, in the pre-distribution phase, the 
source-aggregator key bank is randomly permuted and 
reordered for each source-aggregator pair. This 
ordering of the key bank is stored in the server for each 
source. When a new source node is added, same 
procedure of key bank randomization is followed and 
the key order is stored offline for the new source.  
Now, the source node communicates with the server 
through one of its shared keys. To accomplish this 
action, the source node first generates a random 
number between 1 and K-k. This random number (Rn) 
is sent to the server in plain text. The server 
understands that the source node will encrypt the next 
message by the Rnth number key of the key bank. 
Every time the source node likes to communicate with 
the server, it does the same steps. The random number 
generation process at each session hinders the probable 
guessing attack. It can also be observed that the 
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random number (Rn) is sent to the source in plain text. 
But this does not arise any vulnerability issue, as 
getting the random number by a malicious node does 
not harm because of the randomization of the key bank 
order. The Rnth number key is different in different 
source nodes. The mapping is stored in the server 
offline in pre-distribution stage. 
  
4.b Source to source key establishment: 
 
In order to accomplish source to source key 
establishment, we assume that source to 
aggregator/server key is securely established. So, 
source to source key establishment is done through 
server only not directly between the sources. We 
observe that the k keys are same for all the source 
nodes, it becomes easy for another source node to 
decrypt the information of other sources, i.e. source 3 
can decrypt what source node 1 and source node 2 are 
communicating. To avoid this situation, source node 1 
and source node 2 separately permute the key bank 
order of the k number of keys dedicated for source-
source communication and reorder that randomly. 
After that, they pass the permute function to each 
through the server using their pair-wise key with the 
server. After successful delivery of permute functions, 
one of the source nodes (source node 1, for example) 
sends another random number between 1 and k to the 
other source node (source node 2), which indicates the 
particular key of the permuted key bank. This pair-wise 
key between source nodes will be used for the 
subsequent communication until the data aggregation 
is complete. For next round of data aggregation 
process, same key establishment procedure will be 
followed. 
 
5. Privacy Preservation  
 
In our system model, there are N numbers of source 
nodes. Each source i owns a value xi which it is not 
willing to share with other parties. Suppose that the 
sum is in the range [0, M]. Our objective is to find out 
the sum X privately without revealing the private data 
xi, i=1,2, … , N to each other as well as to the server.  
 


 
The process is initiated by the server. The server 
randomly chooses one of the source nodes and signals 
it to initiate the process. The source node first chosen 
by the server is denoted by c1. This node possesses its 
private data x1 and it generates one random number r1 
between the range [0, M], which is denoted as r1 It then 
computes R1. 
 
     
 
After computing R1, the source node c1 performs 
neighborhood discovery to find out the other source 
nodes it is connected to. This information c1 passes to 
the server. Server keeps the knowledge of the nodes 
already participated. If the source nodes connected to 
c1 is not already participated, the server randomly 
chooses one of those non-participated source nodes and 
sends that message to c1. Let this next source node be 
c2. Now, accordingly c1 passes R1 to c2.  
The source node c2 computes R2. 
 

    
 
The source node follows the same procedure as c1 
and sends R2 to c3. This way cN is reached, which 
computes RN. 
      
 
The server when finds out that all the nodes are 
participated, it asks the last node to send RN to it. 
Server now directs the first source node c1 to compute 
the summation as: 
        


 
           
The source node after computing the summation 
sends that value to the server. The server may process 
it or sends that value for further processing.  
In the case the server/aggregator finds that the 
neighborhood nodes are all participated and still few 
source nodes are left and these source nodes are not 
with the neighborhood range of the last source (who 
does the latest computation and sends that message to 
the server), the server first randomly chooses one of 
the sources not participated. It then sends this message 
to the last participated source. This source then sends 
the computed value to the server. Server/aggregator 
forwards the computed value to the chosen node.  
It can be observed that that each party is assumed to 
have used their correct value xi. If there is no collusion, 
party i only learns the total sum x, and can also 
calculate (x − xi) mod n, i.e., the sum of values of all 
the other source nodes. However, if two or more source 
nodes collude, they can disclose more information. For 
example, if the two neighbors of party i (that is, parties 
i − 1 and i + 1) collude, they can learn xi = (Ri − Ri-1) 
mod n. We have intelligently averted this possibility by 
allowing the server or aggregator to decide the next 
source node. Server does that by choosing randomly 
from the eligible neighbor of the source node. But 
there exists a possibility of colluding through 
bypassing the server. In that case, the source node 
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sends the computed Ri to its friend node (other 
colluding node), the scheme needs to be slightly 
modified. In that scenario, source to source 
communication needs to be strictly via server. There 
should be no direct source to source link. This 
however, increases communication overhead in lieu of 
more reliable security feature. 
It is also to be noted that we cannot fully trust the 
server. Server may attempt to get knowledge the 
knowledge of source’s private data. This can be done 
in the following way.  
Firstly, c1 passes the information of its neighbor to 
the server for forwarding R1 to other sources. If the 
server maliciously tries to capture the computed data 
from the first source node itself by declaring that c1’s 
neighbors are already participated and none is left, the 
server asks c1 to perform the SUM computation and 
sends that value to it. So, the data sends by c1 is its own 
data itself. Server does this for ci, i= 1,2, …, N, by 
subsequently choosing them as both initiator and the 
terminator node. In this way, server can get the private 
value of each of the source nodes. In order to avoid 
that, each time the initiator source node sends the SUM 
value to the server, it compares it with its private value, 
if both happen to be same; initiator source node sends 
the message to the server that “operation cannot be 
performed”. Though, in this case a possibility of false 
alarm arises when the other sources’ private values are 
all zeros. In a dense distributed system with large 
number of nodes, this possibility is very less. 
It can be observed that to perform this operation 
aggregator need not be directly connected to all the 
nodes, but it has at least indirect connection to each 
node, i.e. source node 1 is connected to source node 2 
and source node 2 is connected to source node N, 
which is directly connected to the server. Thus the 
server can reach source node 1 via source node N and 
source node 2. If less number of connections exists 
between the nodes then private data disclosure 
probability comes down (shown later) but key 
establishment becomes less secure due to 
unavailability of direct path [10]. 
 
 
6. Simulation Results 
 
In this section, we show the performance of our 
scheme. In this work, we claim two distinct 
contributions over other privacy preservation data 
aggregation scheme like [1]. First is that in our scheme 
the probability of private data compromised is lesser 
and second is that our scheme has lesser time 
complexity. The second feature makes this scheme 
very much attractive for WSN, where the sensor nodes 
have very limited computational resources and 
processor capacity.  
In CPDA [1] scheme, there exists certain 
probability where private data may be disclosed. This 
can only happen when the sink nodes exchange 
messages within the cluster. This can be estimated as 
 
     1  1  
 !"
#$
 
 
Where Dmax = maximum cluster size, pc = minimum 
cluster size (= 3, two sink nodes and one aggregator), k 
= cluster size, b = probability that link level privacy is 
broken, P(k=m) = probability that a cluster size is m. In 
the case of our scheme, pc = Dmax = k = 2, P(k=m) 
=1. So, we have plotted P(b) for CPDA and our 
scheme in fig. 2. It is observed that the probability of 
privacy compromised in CPDA has much steeper slope 
than that our proposed scheme. 
 
  
Fig. 2 Probability of private data disclosure 
 
In fig. 2, we have compared the computational time 
requirement of our scheme to that of the CPDA scheme 
proposed in [1]. CPDA scheme and the corresponding 
algorithm leverage the algebraic properties of 
polynomials to compute the aggregated result. In 
CPDA algorithm, the computational time increases 
linearly with the addition of number of nodes. In our 
algorithm, we apply modular arithmetic, which incurs 
very less computational load and does have much 
effect with the addition of number of sources. It is to 
be noted that we have compared only the algorithm 
performance. As in CPDA, with number of client 
nodes increases, the computational time increases, we 
constraint number of source nodes to five. It is also 
impractical in CPDA to have large number of nodes in 
a single cluster. The comparison figure reveals the 
computational efficiency of our modular based 
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algorithm. Our scheme has the additional advantage of 
the eliminating the complex cluster formation 
algorithm as in CPDA. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Computation time comparison between 
our scheme and CPDA [1] 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have presented a scheme for 
privacy preservation for secure data aggregation in 
WSN. In the proposed scheme, security of the data is 
ensured by a secured and robust key establishment 
policy. Privacy of the data of the source nodes is 
preserved by the concept of randomization through 
modular arithmetic. Our proposed scheme is basically 
a part of SMC concept [11]. We have shown the 
efficacy of our scheme in simulation results and also 
shown comparison with one existing scheme [1]. We 
have shown low computational time requirement for 
our scheme due to the simplicity of modular arithmetic 
as well as the lesser probability of private data 
disclosure due to secure key establishment. However, 
in this work we have not considered the 
communication overhead incurred in the overall 
scheme. This is included in our future work. 
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